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Abstract: Introspection is the prerequisite of an autonomic behavior, the first
step towards a performance improvement and a resource-usage optimization
for large-scale distributed systems. In Grid environments, the task of observing
the application behavior is assigned to monitoring systems. However, most of
them are designed to provide general resource information and do not consider
specific information for higher-level services. More precisely, in the context of
data-intensive applications, a specific introspection layer is required to collect
data about the usage of storage resources, about data access patterns, etc.
This paper discusses the requirements for an introspection layer in a data-
management system for large-scale distributed infrastructures. We focus on
the case of BlobSeer, a large-scale distributed system for storing massive data.
The paper explains why and how to enhance BlobSeer with introspective ca-
pabilities and proposes a three-layered architecture relying on the MonALISA
monitoring framework. Then we propose a preliminary approach for enabling
self-protection for the BlobSeer system, through a malicious clients detection
component. The introspective architecture has been evaluated on the Grid’5000
testbed, with experiments that prove the feasibility of generating relevant in-
formation related to the state and the behavior of the system.
Key-words: Distributed system, storage management, large-scale system,
monitoring, introspection.
Vers une gestion des données auto-adaptative dans
BlobSeer grâce à l’introspection
Résumé : L’introspection est une condition nécessaire à l’autonomie: c’est
la première étape vers l’amélioration des performances et l’optimisation de
l’utilisation des ressources pour les systèmes repartis à grande échelle. Dans
les grilles de calcul, la surveillance du comportement des applications est à la
charge des systèmes de monitoring. Néanmoins, la plupart d’entre eux sont
conçus pour produire des informations génériques concernant les ressources
et ils ne prennent pas en considération les informations spécifiques aux ser-
vices de plus haut niveau. Plus précisément, dans le contexte des applications
où les données sont utilisées de façon intensive, une couche spécifiquement
dédiée à l’introspection est nécessaire pour recueillir des informations liées à
l’utilisation des ressources de stockage, aux principaux schémas d’accès aux
données, etc.
Ce travail propose de relever les défis posés par le développement d’une
couche d’introspection pour des systèmes de gestion des données réparties à
large échelle comme BlobSeer. Ce rapport analyse les raisons et les moyens
d’ajouter une capacité d’introspection à BlobSeer et propose une architecture
à trois niveaux basée sur la plateforme de surveillance MonALISA. Nous
proposons ensuite une approche préliminaire pour introduire une capacité
d’autoprotection dans BlobSeer grâce à un nouveau module de détection des
clients malveillants.
Cette architecture introspective a été évaluée sur la plate-forme expérimen-
tale Grid’5000 à travers des tests qui démontrent la faisabilité de la génération
des informations pertinentes liées à l’état et au comportement du système.
Mots-clés : Systèmes repartis, gestion des données, système à large échelle,
surveillance, introspection.
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1 Introduction
Managing data at a large scale has become a critical requirement in a wide spec-
trum of research domains, ranging from data-mining to high-energy physics,
biology or climate simulations. Grid infrastructures provide the typical envi-
ronments for such data-intensive applications, enabling access to a large num-
ber of resources and guaranteeing a predictable Quality of Service. However,
as the exponentially growing data is correlated with an increasing need for
fast and reliable data access, data management continues to be a key issue that
highly impacts on the performance of applications.
More specifically, storage systems intended for very large scales have to
address a series of challenges, such as a scalable architecture, data location
transparency, high throughput under concurrent accesses and the storage of
massive data with fine grain access. Although these requirements are the pre-
requisites for any efficient data-management system, they also imply a high
degree of complexity in the configuration and tuning of the system, with pos-
sible repercussions on the system’s availability and reliability.
Such challenges can be overcome if the system is outfitted with a set of self-
management mechanisms that enable autonomic behavior, which can shift the
burden of understanding and managing the system state from the human ad-
ministrator to an automatic decision-making engine. However, self-adaptation
is impossible without a deep and specific knowledge of the state of both the
system and the infrastructure where the system is running on. It heavily re-
lies on introspection mechanisms, which play the crucial role of exposing the
system behavior accurately and in real time.
On existing geographically-distributed platforms (e.g. Grids), introspec-
tion is often limited to low-level tools for monitoring the physical nodes and
the communication interconnect: they typically provide information such as
CPU load, network traffic, job status, file transfer status, etc. In general, such
low-level monitoring tools focus on gathering and storing monitored data in a
scalable and non-intrusive manner [27].
Even though many Grid monitoring applications have been developed to
address such general needs [18] [9], little has been done when it comes to en-
abling introspection for large-scale distributed data management. This is par-
ticularly important in the context of data-intensive applications distributed at
a large scale. In such a context, specific parameters related to data storage need
to be monitored and analyzed in order to enable self-optimization in terms of
resource usage and global performance. Such parameters regard physical data
distribution, storage space availability, data access patterns, application-level
throughput, etc.
This paper discusses the requirements of a large-scale distributed data-
management service in terms of self-management. It explains which self-
adaptation directions can serve a data-management service designed for large-
scale infrastructures. Furthermore, it focuses on introspection, identifying the
specific ways in which introspection can be used to enable an autonomic be-
havior of a distributed data storage system.
As a case study, we focus on BlobSeer [19], a service for sharing massive
data at very large scale in a multi-user environment. We propose a three-
layered architecture enabling BlobSeer with introspection capabilities. We val-
idate our approach through an implementation based on the generic MonAL-
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ISA [16] monitoring framework for large-scale distributed services. Moreover,
we provide an application for the introspection layer, by developing a self-
protection module that takes advantage of the introspective features that Blob-
Seer is equipped with.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes
existing efforts in the Grid monitoring systems field, emphasizing their limita-
tions when it comes to enabling specific introspection requirements. Section 3
explains which self-management directions fit the needs of data-management
systems. Section 4 provides a brief description of BlobSeer, while Section 5
describes the specific self-adaptation goals that can be served by introspection
mechanisms in such a data-management system. It also describes the data that
need to be collected and the solution we designed and implemented, based on
the MonALISA monitoring framework. Section 6 provides an application for
the introspective features of BlobSeer, namely the preliminary steps towards
a self-protection component. In Section 7 we discuss the feasibility and effi-
ciency of our approach, by presenting a visualization tool and a set of experi-
ments realized on the Grid’5000 testbed. Finally, Section 8 draws conclusions
and outlines directions for future developments.
2 Related work
The autonomic behavior of large scale distributed systems aims to deal with
the dynamic adaptation issues by embedding the management of complex
systems inside the systems themselves, alleviating the users and administra-
tors from additional tasks. A distributed service, like a storage service, is said
to be autonomic if it encapsulates some autonomic behavior [10] such as self-
configuration, self-optimization, self-healing, and self-protection [15]. The fo-
cus of our ongoing research is to transparently introduce autonomic behavior
within a distributed storage system in order to make it more resilient to the
failure of the component nodes (self-healing behavior), to enforce the meth-
ods used to deal with malicious clients (self-protection behavior) as well as to
optimize the overall performance based on various computed metrics derived
from an introspection layer (self-optimization behavior).
In this context, performance evaluation becomes a critical component of
any dynamic system that requires high throughput, scheduling, load balancing
or analysis of applications’ performances and communications between nodes.
In Grid environments, previous research has often limited to using historical
information to createmodels on which various analysis andmining techniques
are applied. The results were thereafter used for performing more efficient job
mappings on available resources. The autonomic behavior depends on moni-
toring the distributed system to obtain the data on which decisions are based.
Experiencewith production sites showed that in large distributed systemswith
thousands of managed components, the process of identifying the causes of
faults in due time by extensive search through the potential root failure injec-
tors proves rather time-consuming and difficult. This process may interrupt or
obstruct important system services. Several techniques were used to address
these issues.
One approach relies on Bayesian Networks (BNs) [6], often used to model
systems whose behaviors are not fully understood. We investigated some con-
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sistent work already done on the probabilistic management in distributed sys-
tems. Hood et. al utilize Bayesian networks for the proactive detection of ab-
normal behavior in a distributed system [11]. Steinder et al. apply Bayesian
reasoning techniques to perform fault localization in complex communication
systems [23]. Ding et al. present the probabilistic inference in fault man-
agement based on Bayesian networks [7]. However, the Bayesian Network
paradigm used within all these works does not provide direct mechanisms for
modeling the temporal dependencies in dynamic systems [22], which is essen-
tial for enhancing the autonomic behavior.
Another approach takes time into consideration by identifying the dynamic
changes in distributed systems as a discrete nonlinear time series. One can in-
vestigate time series data aiming at finding some patterns that can trigger spe-
cific actions. In order to identify these patterns, time series are often viewed
as consisting of several components: trend, cycle and irregular fluctuations.
However, recent research showed that it is a challenging task to provide both
scalable and precise continuous system monitoring in large-scale settings to
serve as a data injector for these pattern discovery systems. Existing produc-
tion system monitoring solutions typically use long information updates to
tradeoff information precision for low monitoring cost. Most of autonomic
systems call for more fine-grained, up-to-date, monitoring data.
Previous researchwork on scalable distributed monitoring for autonomous
systems can be broadly classified into two categories: relying on decentralized
architectures such as hierarchical aggregation [25] or peer-to-peer structure [1]
to distribute monitoring workload; and trading off information coverage [17]
or information precision [13] for lower monitoring cost. In contrast, our re-
search focuses on identifying the relevant parameters for an autonomic intro-
spection layer, while relying on the extension and adaptation of some exist-
ing monitoring tools for tracking these parameters. The monitoring solution
should further meet our needs for non-intrusiveness and minimized monitor-
ing costs.
Exploring correlation patterns among distributed monitoring data sources
has been extensively studied in various contexts such as sensor network mon-
itoring [26], distributed event tracking [12], and resource discovery [4]. While
the general idea of exploring temporal and spatial correlations is not new, we
shall emphasize applying the idea to distributed information tracking over
large-scale networked systems requires non-trivial system analysis and design.
In our case, it means discovering dynamic correlation patterns (for some prede-
fined targeted events: node failures, malicious clients intrusions, etc.) among
distributed information sources, using light-weight methods instead of assum-
ing a specific probabilistic model, as in wireless sensor networks, for instance.
Theworks mentioned above, although they are able to provide somemeans
of monitoring for singular or aggregate services, they do not dynamically re-
place the faulty service once failure has been detected, or take automated ac-
tions to optimize the overall system’s performance, as our work aims to within
a large scale distributed storage system.
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3 Self-adaptation for large scale data-management
systems
A large scale data-management platform is a complex system that has to deal
with changing rates of concurrent users, the management of huge data spread
across hundreds of nodes or with malicious attempts to access or to damage
stored data. Therefore, such a system can benefit from a self-adaptation com-
ponent that enables an autonomic behavior. We refine the set of self-adaptation
directions that best suit the the requirements of data-management systems:
they match the main self-management properties defined for autonomic sys-
tems [15] [21].
Self-awareness is the feature that enables a system to be aware of the resource
usage and the state of its components and of the infrastructure where
they are running. This is mainly achieved through monitoring and inter-
preting the relevant information generated by the usage of the system.
Self-optimization is the ability to efficiently allocate and use resources, while
dealing with changing workloads. It aims at optimizing the system’s per-
formance and increasing data availability.
Self-configuration is the property that addresses the dynamic adaptation of
the system’s deployment scheme as a response to changing environment
conditions. The system has to be able to reconfigure on the fly, when its
state requires or allows for a change in the number of managed nodes.
Self-protection addresses the detection of hostile or intrusive actions directed
towards the system’s components and enables the system to automat-
ically take appropriate measures to enforce security policies and make
itself less vulnerable to subsequent similar attacks.
In order to improve the performance and the efficiency of the resource us-
age in a data-sharing system, we define a set of goals that justify the need for
the aforementioned properties:
Monitoring The constant surveillance of the state of a system and of the
events that trigger system reactions is the prerequisite of all the other self-
adaptation directions. Thus, the self-awareness property is of utmost impor-
tance for providing support for an autonomous behavior.
Dynamic dimensioning The performance of data-access primitives is influ-
enced by the number of running nodes of the data-sharing system. Moreover,
the load of each component that stores data is also dependent on the available
storage nodes and on their capacity to serve user requests. On the other hand,
the workload is often unpredictable, and the deployment of the system on a
large number of physical nodes can lead to underused storage nodes when the
number of clients is low or the stored data is not large enough.
These reasons account for the need to enhance a large-scale storage system
with a mechanism that dynamically adjusts the number of deployed storage
nodes. This is equivalent to taking advantage of the real-time indicators of the
RR n° 7452
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(a) The architecture of the BlobSeer system (b) The architecture of the introspective
BlobSeer
Figure 1: BlobSeer
state of the system within a self-configuration component that can observe a
heavy load or underutilized components.
Adaptive allocation algorithms and replication strategies Data striping is
an essential requirement of a system that deals with huge data sequences. In
addition, the placement strategies for the data chunks play a key role in achiev-
ing a high throughput when accessing the stored data. Data replication is an-
other important feature of a data-sharing system, since many applications re-
quire a high data availability. The appropriate replication degree for a given
data block is not always the same, as the needs of the application can evolve
along with the amount of stored data and with the number of clients concur-
rently accessing it. These two aspects justify the need for a self-optimization
building block within a large-scale storage system. It has to address both the
automatic adaptation of the allocation algorithms for the storage nodes corre-
sponding to the data chunks and the dynamic adjustment of the replication
degree, according to the load of the storage nodes and to data access patterns.
Malicious clients detection A data-sharing system distributed on a large
number of nodes can fit the needs of applications that generate important
amounts of data only if it can provide a degree of security for the stored in-
formation. For this reason, the system has to be able to recognize malicious
requests generated by unauthorized users and to block illegal attempts to in-
ject or to modify data. Therefore, a self-protection component that enforces
these requirements has to be integrated into the system.
4 BlobSeer
BlobSeer is a data-sharing system which addresses the problem of efficiently
storing massive, unstructured data blocks called binary large objects (referred to
as BLOBs further in this paper), in large-scale, distributed environments. The
BLOBs are fragmented into small, equally-sized chunks, called pages. BlobSeer
provides an efficient fine-grained access to the pages belonging to each BLOB,
RR n° 7452
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as well as the possibility to modify them, in distributed, multi-user environ-
ments.
The architecture of BlobSeer (Figure 1(a)) includes multiple, distributed
entities. Clients initiate all BLOB operations: CREATE, READ, WRITE and
APPEND. There can be many concurrent clients accessing the same BLOB or
different BLOBs in the same time. The support for concurrent operations is en-
hanced by storing the pages belonging to the same BLOB on multiple storage
providers. The metadata associated with each BLOB are hosted on other com-
ponents, called metadata providers. BlobSeer provides versioning support, so
as to prevent pages from being overwritten and to be able to handle highly-
concurrent WRITE and APPEND operations. For each of them, only a patch
composed of the range of written pages is added to the system. Finally, the
system comprises two more entities: the version manager that deals with the
serialization of the concurrent WRITE/APPEND requests and with the assign-
ment of version numbers for each newWRITE/APPEND operation; the provider
manager, which keeps track of all storage providers in the system.
As far as this paper is concerned, an APPEND operation can be considered
as a special case of WRITE. Therefore, we disregard this distinction in the rest
of the paper. Everything stated about WRITEs is also true for APPENDs, unless
explicitly specified.
A typical setting of the BlobSeer system involves the deployment of a few
hundreds storage providers, storing BLOBs of the order of the TB. The typi-
cal size for a page within a blob can be smaller that 1 MB, whence the chal-
lenge of dealing with hundreds of thousands of pages belonging to just one
BLOB. BlobSeer provides efficient support for heavily-concurrent accesses to
the stored data, reaching a throughput of 6.7 GB/s aggregated bandwidth for
a configuration with 60 metadata providers, 90 data providers and 360 concur-
rent writers, as explained in [20].
5 Towards an introspective BlobSeer
Our goal is to enhance BlobSeer with introspection capabilities, in order to en-
able this data-sharing platform with an autonomic behavior. To meet this goal,
we have designed a three-layered architecture aiming at identifying and gen-
erating relevant information related to the state and the behavior of the sys-
tem (Figure 1(b)). Such information is then expected to serve as an input to a
higher-level self-adaptation engine. These data are yielded by an (1) introspection
layer, which processes the raw data collected by a (2) monitoring layer. The low-
est layer is represented by the (3) instrumentation code that enables BlobSeer to
send monitoring data to the upper layers.
5.1 Self-adaptation: what to adapt?
To introduce an autonomic behavior in BlobSeer, we considered several as-
pects.
Dynamic dimensioning Extensive performance evaluations [20] carried out
for BlobSeer reveal that the aggregate bandwidth of concurrent WRITE or
READ operations grows as the number of data providers and metadata
RR n° 7452
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providers increases. However, deploying BlobSeer’s providers on a large num-
ber of physical nodes can be an expensive approach, and their optimum num-
ber is often unpredictable, as it depends on the load of the providers and on
the number of clients concurrently accessing them.
These aspects justify the need for a mechanism enabling a dynamic adjust-
ment of the number of running data/metadata providers, according to the state
of the system and its real-time requirements in terms of load and number of
client requests and available nodes.
State-dependent allocation algorithms for storage providers Currently,
each time a client writes some data on a BLOB, it receives a set of providers
from the providermanager, andwrites each page on one of them. The provider
manager allocates the providers in a round-robin manner; therefore a balanced
storage-space load among providers is expected.
Nevertheless, the behavior may deviate from the expected one, as several
factors can impact the efficiency of such a straightforward load-balancing algo-
rithm. The number of concurrent clients requesting access to the same provider
plays a major role in the performance of the WRITE or READ operations. Con-
current data accesses have to be serialized, leading to slow or even unrespon-
sive providers. A more advanced provider-allocation algorithm, taking into
account such factors that influence the behavior of the providers, would bring
an improvement of the overall performance of BlobSeer.
Adaptive data replication strategies BlobSeer is designed to be used by data-
intensive applications, such as the ones related to astronomy, data mining or
multimedia processing. To fully fit the needs of these applications, it also has
to ensure that a number of replicas is maintained for the stored data. When
a BLOB is created, the client has to specify the number of replicas that will
be generated for each of its pages. But the “optimal” number of replicas may
vary across the BLOB’s versions and even across pages, as their usage patterns
may be different. As a consequence, BlobSeer can benefit from a self-tuning
mechanism for dynamic selection of the replication level for each BLOB.
5.2 Introspection: what data to collect?
All the improvement directions stated above can only be effective if the self-
adaptation engine receives accurate data from the introspection layer. The lat-
ter generates data ranging from general information about the running nodes
to specific data regarding the stored BLOBs and their structure.
General information These data are essentially concerned with the physical
resources of the nodes that act as storage providers. They include CPU usage,
network traffic, disk usage, storage space or memory.
A self-adapting system has to take into account information about the val-
ues of these parameters across the nodes that make up the system, as well as
about the state of the entire system. For instance, the used and available storage
space at each single provider play a crucial role in deciding whether additional
providers are needed or not. Besides the values for these basic data belonging
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to each provider, the system also needs access to aggregated data, such as the
value of the total storage space occupied/available for the entire system.
Individual BLOB-related data The most significant information for a single
BLOB is its access pattern, i.e. the way the pages and the versions are accessed
through READ and WRITE operations. The basic data are the number of read
accesses for each page that the BLOB version consists of, and the number of
WRITE operations performed on the BLOB for each page. Since each WRITE
or READ operation consists in accessing a range of consecutive pages, it is ex-
pected that some ranges of pages will have the same number of accesses. As a
consequence, these data facilitate the identification of the regions of the BLOB
comprising pages with a similar number of accesses, information that can in-
fluence the adopted replication strategy.
From another viewpoint, the number of accesses can be associated with the
version of the BLOB that they refer to. This approach enables a comparison
between the sizes of the versions and their usage, i.e. the number of READ
requests for each of them. This is a valuable information for the replication
algorithms, which can assign more replicas to the versions highly accessed by
the clients.
Global state Even though the provider-allocation algorithm or the replica-
tion strategy have access to the details within each BLOB, it is not irrelevant
to have an overview of the whole data stored in the BlobSeer system, from a
higher-level point of view. Some of the key data at this global level are the to-
tal number of accesses associated with each provider. This is a measure of the
load of each of them and can directly influence the selection of the providers
that will be allocated new pages, depending on their deviation from the aver-
age load within the system.
The other system-wide data refer to the distribution of all the BLOBs across
providers. The number of BLOB pages hosted on each provider, as well as
their sizes, comprise a compact information about the way the data are man-
aged. It can trigger a response from the provider manager, in case there are
load variations between the providers with respect to one or more BLOBs. It
can be equally useful to expose the BLOBs that have a high rate of change or
growth, as opposed to the BLOBs that contain data that is seldom modified.
The dynamic growth of the BLOBs can be emphasized through the number of
WRITE operations performed on each BLOB, which is equivalent to the num-
ber of versions, or through the number of pages written for each BLOB, i.e. the
total size of its versions.
5.3 Monitoring: how to collect?
The input for the introspective layer consists of rawdata that are extracted from
the running nodes of BlobSeer, collected and then stored, a set of operations
realized within the monitoring layer. Therefore, it can rely on a monitoring
system designed for large-scale environments that implements these features.
Such amonitoring framework has to be both scalable and extensible, so as to be
able to deal with the huge number of events generated by a large-scale data-
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management system, as well as to accommodate system-specific monitoring
information and to offer a flexible storage schema for the collected data.
The monitoring framework – MonALISA The Global Grid Forum [8] pro-
posed a Grid Monitoring Architecture (GMA) [24], which defines the compo-
nents needed by a scalable and flexible Grid monitoring system: producers,
consumers, and a directory service. A wide variety of Grid monitoring sys-
tems [27], such as Ganglia [18], RGMA [5], GridICE [3], comply with this ar-
chitecture.
Among them, we selected MonALISA (Monitoring Agents in a Large Inte-
grated Services Architecture) [16] for our data-monitoring tasks, as it is a general-
purpose, flexible framework, which provides the necessary tools for collect-
ing and processing monitoring information in large-scale distributed systems.
Moreover, it is an easily-extensible system, which allows the definition and
processing of user-specific data, by means of an API for dynamically-loadable
modules. MonALISA is currently used to monitor large high-energy physics
facilities; it is deployed on over 300 sites belonging to several experiments,
such as CMS or ALICE [2].
MonALISA is based on four layers of services, the Lookup and Discovery Ser-
vices, the MonALISA services – the components dealing with the data-collection
tasks, the Proxy services that make possible the communication between the
services and the clients and the MonALISA clients and repositories, which act as
consumers.
In BlobSeer, the main challenge the monitoring layer has to cope with, is
the large number of storage provider nodes and therefore the huge number of
BLOB pages, versions and huge BLOB sizes. Furthermore, it has to deal with
hundreds of clients that concurrently access various parts of the stored BLOBs,
as they generate a piece of monitoring information for each page accessed on
each provider. MonALISA is suitable for this task, as it is a system designed
for large-scale environments and it proved to be both scalable and reliable.
Instrumenting BlobSeer The data generated by the instrumentation layer
are relayed by the monitoring system and finally fed to the introspection layer.
The instrumentation layer is implemented as a component of the monitoring
layer. The MonALISA framework provides a library called ApMon that can be
used to send the monitoring data to the MonALISA services. At the providers,
the instrumentation code consists in listeners located on each of them, which
report to the monitoring system each time a page is written or read. The mon-
itoring information from the version manager is collected using a parser that
monitors the events recorded in the logs. The state of the physical resources on
each node is monitored through an ApMon thread that periodically sends data
to the monitoring service.
6 Introducing self-adaptation for BlobSeer - mali-
cious clients detection
In order to provide a proof of concept for the introspective BlobSeer, we de-
signed a component that makes use of the user activity history yielded by the
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introspection layer to identify illegal or harmful client actions. Detecting ma-
licious clients is the first step towards enabling self-protection for the BlobSeer
system. However, such a feature has to take into account several types of secu-
rity threats and to react when such attacks occur.
In this section, we discuss the directions that should be addressed by such
a self-protection component and propose a simple malicious clients detection
module that focuses on protocol breaches within BlobSeer.
6.1 Scenarios for malicious user behavior
Detecting malicious accesses within data-management systems consists of two
phases. The first one implies the creation of a history of the users’ actions
and the constant monitoring of their real-time data-accesses. The second phase
corresponds to the detection of the malicious user behavior. In this section,
we consider the problem of detecting illegal user actions and focus on a set of
malicious behavior scenarios:
Protocol breach. Amalicious user can try to compromise the system by delib-
erately breaking the data-insertion protocols. This kind of behavior is a
starting point for DoS attacks, in which the user attempts to overload the
system through large numbers of malformed or incomplete requests. To
cope with this security risk, advanced mechanisms have to be developed
to quickly detect the illegal accesses and isolate the user that initiated
them.
Breaking existing policies. Enabling data-access policies is a key design prin-
ciple for accountability in a data-management system. The policies de-
fine a set of restrictions associated with users or with groups of users,
such as transfer-bandwidth limitations or storage quotas. By monitoring
the user activity, any attempt to break these policies can be detected and
the user’s access rights can be restricted accordingly.
Abnormal client activity. Whereas the first two scenarios emphasize misbe-
havior detection, another approach is to analyze the user’s access pat-
terns and to identify anomalies in their activity, even though it is correct
with respect to the access protocols and policies. In this case, a deviation
from the previously observed behavior can be a symptom of an unautho-
rized access to data or an attempt to affect the system.
6.2 Protocol breach scenarios for BlobSeer
We focus on detecting protocol breaches, as this approach is a critical feature
of a data-management system that has to face malicious users. Its goal is to
identify the known forms of protocol misuse, and thus to maintain a consistent
state for the data stored into the system.
In BlobSeer, accesses to data can be classified into three categories:
BLOB creation is achieved through a request to the version manager, which
creates an empty BLOB associated with a unique ID.
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The READ operation consists of two phases. First, the metadata associated
with the required BLOB id and version are gathered from the metadata
providers. Second, the stored pages are read from the data providers,
whose locations were contained within the fetched metadata.
The WRITE operation implies several steps. The user connects to the
provider manager and requests a list of data providers that can host the
pages to be written. Then, the pages are written in parallel on the data
providers. Finally, after this step is successfully completed, the client
writes the metadata to the metadata providers and then publishes the
new version to the version manager.
The creation of new BLOBs cannot be the target of a data-access protocol
attack, since it consists of only one request that is atomically handled by the
version manager. Furthermore, the read operation is not concerned with this
type of attack either; the users are allowed to read as many metadata as they
want. They may read just a part of the pages corresponding to the metadata
they fetched, or the metadata can be cached for further use. Therefore, no
assumption can be made on the relationship between the collected metadata
and the read pages, since the protocol does not require the user to read a fixed
number of metadata records and all the associated pages.
In contrast, the WRITE operation imposes a strict protocol to the user that
wants to correctly insert data into the system. For simplicity we can assume
that it consists of two independent phases that have to be executed consecu-
tively:
The data-writing step comprises the user’s request for a list of data providers
and the transfer of the page range to be written to those providers.
The data-publication step is represented by the creation of the metadata asso-
ciatedwith the written data and the publication of the written page range
as a new version.
A correct WRITE operation is defined as the successful completion of the
aforementioned steps, with the constraint that the published information con-
cerning the written page range is consistent with the actual data sent to the
data providers. As a consequence, there are three types of protocol breaches
that can be detected for the WRITE operation:
Data written and not published. In this case, a malicious user obtains a list of
providers from the provider manager and then starts writing data to the
providers. The second step is never issued and thus the version man-
ager, which keeps track of all the BLOBs and their versions, will never be
aware of the data inserted into the system. This kind of protocol breach
can be developed into a Denial of Service (DoS) attack, targeted to the
overloading of one or more data providers.
Data published without being written. This scenario is representative for a
user who attempts to compromise the system by making available data
that does not actually exist. Thus, other users might try to read the pub-
lished data without being aware that the metadata contain fake refer-
ences.
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Publication of inconsistent data. The attack that corresponds to this situation
aims to disrupt the computations that use data stored by the BLOBs. As
an example, the user might write just the data corresponding to the be-
ginning of the published range. Therefore, an application can start read-
ing and processing the data and discover only later that the used BLOB
version is incomplete. Hence the computation would be compromised
and the application forced to restart the processing.
6.3 The detection mechanism
Enabling self-protection in BlobSeer relies on coupling a malicious-clients de-
tection module with the introspection layer. On the one hand, such a module
has to identify the malicious activities that attempt to compromise the system
and to isolate users that initialize them. On the other hand, it should not inter-
fere with BlobSeer operations, so as to preserve the efficient data-accesses for
which BlobSeer is optimized. The introspection layer processes informations
monitored independently of the interactions between the user and the system,
and thus it is an ideal candidate to provide input data for a malicious clients
detection module.
We implemented a simple detection module that addresses the protocol-
breach attacks and generates blacklists with the users that attempt them. Its
input data are provided as a user history database by the introspection layer.
The database is updated each time a user accesses data in BlobSeer and the
monitoring system receives corresponding notifications. The detection mod-
ule comprises several components, each of them dealing with a specific type
of protocol breach. Each component performs the following operations: it pe-
riodically requests updates from the history database and identifies the incon-
sistencies between the data collected from the providers and the data that orig-
inates from the version manager. Then, a score associated with each client is
computed, so as to identify the clients that repeatedly misbehave. Finally, the
system generates a blacklist with the detected clients and their associated score.
The goal of the detection mechanism is to keep track of the malicious users
and to feed this information back into the BlobSeer system, so as to enable it to
react when receiving new requests from the users identified as malicious. The
malicious users can be made available to the provider manager as a blacklist
where each user’s score shows the amount of fake data that the user intro-
duced into the BlobSeer system. The provider manager implements the allo-
cation strategy that assigns providers for each user WRITE operation. Being
aware of the blacklist, the provider manager can decide to block the malicious
users by not granting the providers when they want to write again into the
system. The behavior of the provider manager can be further refined by tak-
ing into account the score associated with each client. In this case, there are
several other constraints that can be enforced on the users, such as a decreased
bandwidth for their WRITE operations, a waiting time imposed before being
assigned the necessary list of providers or a size limit for the data written.
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(a) Number of WRITE accesses on the logi-
cal address pages for a BLOB
(b) Version access patterns
Figure 2: BLOB accesses visualization
7 Experimental evaluation
We evaluated the feasibility of gathering and interpreting the BlobSeer-specific
data needed as input data for the different self-optimizing directions. Our
approach was to create an introspection layer on top of the monitoring sys-
tem, able to process the raw data collected from BlobSeer and to extract sig-
nificant information regarding the state and the behavior of the system. We
performed a series of experiments that evaluate the introspection layer and
also provide some preliminary results concerning the introduction of self-
protection capabilities in BlobSeer. The experiments were conducted on the
Grid’5000 [14] testbed, a large-scale experimental Grid platform, with reconfig-
uration and control capabilities, that covers 9 sites geographically distributed
across France.
7.1 Visualization tool for BlobSeer-specific data
We implemented a visualization tool that can provide a graphical representa-
tion of the most important parameters yielded by the introspection layer.
We show the outcome of the introspection layer through an evaluation per-
formed on 127 nodes belonging to a Grid’5000 cluster in Rennes. The nodes are
equippedwith x86_64 CPUs and at least 4 GB of RAM. They are interconnected
through a Gigabit Ethernet network. We deployed each BlobSeer entity on a
dedicated node, as follows: two nodes were used for the version manager and
the provider manager, 10 nodes for the metadata providers, 100 nodes for the
storage providers and 10 nodes acted as BlobSeer clients, writing data to the
BlobSeer system. Four nodes hosted MonALISA services, which transferred
the data generated by the instrumentation layer built on top of the BlobSeer
nodes to a MonALISA repository. The repository is the location where the data
were stored and made available to the introspection layer.
In this experiment, we used 10 BLOBs, each of them having the page size
of 1 MB and a total size larger than 20 GB. We started the 10 clients, each of
them having to create a BLOB and to write 10 data blocks of 2 GB each on it.
Each data block overlaps the previous one by 10%. Next, we started the clients
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Figure 3: BLOBs versions and sizes
in parallel and each of them performed a number of WRITE operations on a
randomly selected BLOB. The blocks were written on the BLOB at random off-
sets and they consisted of a random number of pages, ranging between 512MB
and 2 GB in size. This experiment lasted for a dozenminutes. All figures below
are real graphical representations of data provided by the introspection layer
at the end of this experiment.
We processed the raw data collected by the monitoring layer and extracted
the higher-level data within the introspection layer. Some results are presented
below, along with their graphical representations.
Access patterns They represent a significant information that the introspec-
tion layer has to be aware of. It can be obtained by computing the number of
READ/WRITE accesses. The access patterns can be examined from two points
of view. The first one regards the access patterns for each BLOB. It considers
the number of read accesses for each page, for a specified version or for the
whole BLOB and it identifies the regions of the BLOB composed of pages with
the same number of accesses (Figure 2(a)). The other one refers to the number
of READ or WRITE operations performed on each provider, allowing a classi-
fication of the providers according to the pressure of the concurrent accesses
they have to withstand.
The distribution of READ/WRITE accesses across the BLOB versions The
versions can be weighted by counting the number of read accesses or of phys-
ical memory pages for each of them, as shown in Figure 2(b). This approach
exposes the tendencies of the READ operations over the versions or the various
sizes of the WRITE operations, as the number of write accesses for a specified
version is equivalent with the number of pages written.
The structure and sizes of all the stored BLOBs The differences between
BLOBs, in terms of size or number of versions, highlight the BLOBs that have
the most important growth (Figure 3). This information, along with the num-
ber of accesses for each BLOB, emphasize the most valuable BLOBs in the sys-
tem.
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Figure 4: Performance evaluations
7.2 Impact of the introspection architecture on the Blobseer
data-access performance
This experiment is designed to evaluate the impact of using the BlobSeer sys-
tem in conjunction with the introspection architecture. The introspective layer
collects data from BlobSeer without disrupting the interactions between its
components, and thus no constraint is enforced on the user’s accesses to the
BlobSeer entities. In this way the throughput of the BlobSeer system is not in-
fluenced by the detection module. The only downside of such a system is the
intrusiveness of the instrumentation layer that runs at the level of the BlobSeer
components and is susceptible of decreasing their performance.
For this experiment we used the Grid’5000 clusters located in Rennes and
Orsay. The nodes are equipped with x86_64 CPUs and at least 2 GB of RAM.
We used a typical configuration for the BlobSeer system, which enables the
system to store massive amounts of data that can reach the order of TB. It con-
sists of 150 data providers, 20 metadata providers, one provider manager and
one version manager. Both data and metadata providers store data on their
hard disks and they are configured to store up to 64 GB and 8 GB, respectively.
The MonALISA monitoring services are deployed on 20 nodes and they col-
lect monitoring data from all the providers, each of them being dynamically
assigned to a monitoring service in the deployment phase. The repository that
gathers all the monitored parameters is located outside Grid’5000, as well as
the detection module that interacts only with the repository’s database. Each
entity is deployed on a dedicated physical machine.
This test consists of deploying a number of concurrent clients that make a
single WRITE operation. Each client writes 1 GB of data in a separate BLOB,
using a page size of 8 MB. Since the introspective layer computes its output
based on the monitored data generated for each written page, the more fine-
grained BLOBs we use, the more monitoring information has to be processed.
Therefore, we allocate 128 pages for each client to show the ability of the intro-
spective system to deal with a large number of monitored parameters.
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We compare the aggregated throughput of the BlobSeer WRITE operation
obtained when deploying BlobSeer alone and with the introspection layers on
top of it. The throughput is measured for a number of clients ranging from 5
to 80 and the experiment was repeated 3 times for each value of the number of
clients deployed.
Figure 4(a) shows that the BlobSeer system enhanced with the introspective
components performs well even when the number of generated monitoring
parameters reaches 10, 000, as it is the case when testing with more than 80
clients. Note that the duration of the WRITE operations performed by these 80
clients in parallel is under 5 seconds. Therefore the system is able to cope with
a high rate of monitoring data generated when a wave of clients concurrently
access the system.
7.3 Malicious clients detection
We aim to explore the first step towards a self-protecting BlobSeer system, by
building a component that can detect illegal actions and prevent malicious
users from damaging the stored data. To reach this goal, the detection mech-
anism for the malicious users has to deliver an accurate image of the users’
interaction with BlobSeer. Moreover, it has to expose the illegal operations as
fast as possible, so as to limit the size of data illegally injected into the sys-
tem and to prevent the malicious users from carrying on the harmful accesses.
We define the detection delay as the duration of the detection phase after the
end of the client’s operations. We use the detection delay as a measure of the
performance of the detection module.
The aim of this experiment is to analyze the performance of the detec-
tion module when the system is accessed by multiple concurrent malicious
clients that publish data without actually writing them. This access pattern
corresponds to a scenario where a number of clients access a reputation-based
data-storage service. Each client can increase his reputation by sharing a large
amount of data with the other users of the system. To achieve this goal, a mali-
cious client may pretend to share huge data, while it only skips the datawriting
phase of the WRITE operation and publishes inexistent data.
The deployment settings are identical to the previous experiment. We want
to assess the behavior of the system under illegal concurrent accesses. Thus
we deploy only malicious clients, repeating the test with an increasing number
of clients, ranging from 5 to 80. We measure both the duration of the WRITE
operation of the client and the delay between the beginning of the WRITE and
the detection of the client that initiated it as being malicious. All the clients
start writing at the same time, thus having the same start time. For each point
in the chart, we compute the average time between all the clients deployed for
that run.
The results obtained in Figure 4(b) show that the detection process is able to
cope with a large number of concurrent clients and to deliver results in a short
amount of time after the end of the WRITE operation.
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8 Conclusions and future work
This paper addresses the challenges raised by the introduction of introspec-
tion into a data-management system for large-scale, distributed infrastruc-
tures. Such a feature aims at exposing general and service-specific data to a
higher-level layer, in order to enable the system to evolve towards an auto-
nomic behavior. We propose a layered architecture built on top of the BlobSeer
data-management system, a service dedicated to large-scale sharing of massive
data. The goal of this architecture is to generate a set of specific data that can
serve as input for a self-adaptive engine. The architecture consists of 3 layers:
1) an instrumentation layer that extracts the low-level, raw data from the dif-
ferent components of BlobSeer; 2) a monitoring layer that deals with collecting
and storing the monitoring data from the instrumentation layer; and 3) an in-
trospective layer that processes the gathered data into higher-level information
describing the state and the behavior of the system.
We also proposed a malicious clients detection component that relies on
data yielded by the introspection layer. It focuses on identifying data-access
protocol breaches in BlobSeer, thus being the first step towards enhancing this
system with self-protection.
To build the monitoring layer, we relied on the MonALISA general-
purpose, large-scale monitoring framework, for its versatility and extensibility.
Our experiments showed that it was able to scale with the number of BlobSeer
providers and to cope with the huge amount of monitoring data generated
by a large number of clients. Moreover, it allowed us to define and to col-
lect BlobSeer-specific data, and to extend the existing visualization charts with
new ones that met the requirements of BlobSeer. The experiments performed
confirm the outcome of the introspection layer, by means of graphical repre-
sentations associated with the various high-level data extracted.
The next step will consist in developing the malicious clients detection
module into a generic security component that can handle a greater number
of security threats and can take actions to prevent harmful client activities,
thus enabling self-protection for BlobSeer. Furthermore, we will equip Blob-
Seer with other self-adaptive components that will employ the output of the
introspection layer to optimize the system’s performance and resource usage.
As an example, by allowing BlobSeer to dynamically dimension the number of
each of its entities, this engine will help improving the storage resource alloca-
tion strategy. Besides, it can also provide information based on which adaptive
data replication strategies can be implemented. Together, such features will
enable an autonomic behavior of the BlobSeer data-management platform.
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